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Race on the Brain, by Jonathan Kahn 
Abstract 
Canadians and Americans alike are often reluctant to honestly confront our respective nations’ histories 
of racism and discrimination. Unflinchingly describing a legacy of colonialism, genocide of Indigenous 
peoples, and multigenerational slavery, is a great deal more uncomfortable than the academically “safe” 
analyses advanced by critical race theory. Simply put, academic conversations around “racism” are 
increasingly being replaced with conversations about “bias.” This is what legal scholar Jonathan Kahn 
addresses in his book Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong about the Struggle for Racial 
Justice. Kahn’s book is a response to a trend toward scientism within the interdisciplinary academic 
communities of cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the law. Essentially, Kahn contends that there is 
an ideology of over-reliance on science as a purportedly objective means of understanding complex 
social issues, such as racism. This trend has resulted in what Kahn argues to be an unwarranted 
privileging of scientific empiricism in the struggle for racial justice. 
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SHRUTI RAMESH2
Canadians and Americans alike are often reluctant to honestly confront our respective 
nations’ histories of racism and discrimination. Unflinchingly describing a legacy of 
colonialism, genocide of Indigenous peoples, and multigenerational slavery, is a great deal 
more uncomfortable than the academically “safe” analyses advanced by critical race theory. 
Simply put, academic conversations around “racism” are increasingly being replaced with 
conversations about “bias.” This is what legal scholar Jonathan Kahn addresses in his 
book Race on the Brain: What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong about the Struggle for Racial Justice. 
Kahn’s book is a response to a trend toward scientism within the interdisciplinary academic 
communities of cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and the law. Essentially, Kahn contends 
that there is an ideology of over-reliance on science as a purportedly objective means of 
understanding complex social issues, such as racism. This trend has resulted in what Kahn 
argues to be an unwarranted privileging of scientific empiricism in the struggle for racial 
justice.
Why is equality so assiduously avoided? Why does white America delude itself, and 
how does it rationalize the evil it retains? The majority of white Americans … [b]
elieve that American society is essentially hospitable to fair play and to steady growth 
toward a middle-class Utopia embodying racial harmony. But unfortunately, this is 
a fantasy of self-deception and comfortable vanity.3
CANADIANS AND AMERICANS ALIKE are often reluctant to honestly confront our 
respective nations’ histories of racism and discrimination. Unflinchingly describing 
a legacy of colonialism, the genocide of Indigenous peoples, and multigenerational 
slavery, is a great deal more uncomfortable than the academically “safe” analyses 
advanced by critical race theory. Simply put, academic conversations around 
1. (Columbia University Press, 2017).
2. JD Candidate 2020, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Canada.
3. Martin Luther King, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community? (Beacon 
Press, 2010) at 4-5.
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“racism” are increasingly being replaced with conversations about “bias.” This is 
what legal scholar Jonathan Kahn seeks to address in his book Race on the Brain: 
What Implicit Bias Gets Wrong About the Struggle for Racial Justice.4
Kahn’s book is a response to an increasing trend of scientism prevalent 
within the interdisciplinary academic communities of cognitive psychology, 
neuroscience, and the law. Essentially, Kahn contends that there is an over-reliance 
on science as a purportedly objective means of understanding complex social 
issues, such as racism. This trend has resulted in what Kahn argues to be an 
unwarranted privileging of scientific empiricism prevalent within the debate 
surrounding racial justice. In particular, Kahn takes issue with the increasing 
application of implicit social cognition (ISC) to the law, through a lens he refers 
to as “behavioural realism.” His primary concern is that behavioural realism is 
becoming the dominant narrative, rather than a complementary framework for 
understanding and addressing racism.5 Although Kahn’s book is grounded in 
the sociopolitical context of the United States, it is important to keep in mind 
that his arguments can easily be applied to the discourse surrounding race in 
Canada and constitutional jurisprudence around equality. Notwithstanding this, 
the discussion below will be limited to the American context.
I. UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIOURAL REALISM
ISC includes mental processes that operate without conscious awareness or 
control, but nevertheless influence fundamental evaluations of individuals and 
groups.6 It manifests as implicit bias at an individual level which, according to 
Kahn, involves three steps: the mental recognition or construction of a social 
group, the association of a stereotype with that group, and the layering of positive 
or negative associations or attitudes on top of that stereotype.7 This process is 
important because, according to ISC scholars, implicit bias is empirically 
distinct from explicit prejudice; implicit social cognitions therefore uniquely 
and predictably alter individual judgements that contribute to discriminatory 
decisions, including judicial decisions.8
4. Supra note 1.
5. Ibid at 10-11.
6. Ibid at 21, citing Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R Banaji, “Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of ‘Affirmative Action’” (2006) 94 Cal L Rev 1063 at 1064.
7. Ibid at 25.
8. Ibid at 21. See also Mahzarin R Banaji & Anthony G Greenwald, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of 
Good People (Delacorte Press, 2013).
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In the early chapters of the book, Kahn outlines several ways in which 
implicit bias has been measured and codified, including the use of Implicit 
Association Tests and cognitive behavioural tasks. Bias has also been measured 
through utilizing imaging techniques such as fMRI to investigate potential 
neural correlates of discrimination. Although ISC theorists vary widely in their 
approaches, there is consensus among them that even though one might seek to 
be impartial, or know certain biases are wrong to hold, implicit biases nonetheless 
play a powerful role in determining behaviour.9 For instance, in the context of 
race this would mean that a large part of the behaviour that produces racial 
discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial biases. Scholars of behavioural 
realism argue that institutions such as the law should subsequently account for 
this new understanding of human behaviour and decision making, i.e., that the 
law should comport to science.10
What would this look like in practice? Kahn details the work of early 
behavioural realists such as Linda Hamilton Krieger,11 Christine Jolls,12 and Susan 
T. Fiske,13 crediting them with the introduction of psychology and neuroscience 
as “sources of authority” used to guide and instruct the courts in their decision 
making. Krieger and Fiske built much of their initial arguments around the 
United States Supreme Court decision of Price Waterhouse v Hopkins.14 The US 
Court in Price Waterhouse held that in the context of employment discrimination, 
so long as the plaintiff could demonstrate that an impermissible motive was 
determinative in making an adverse employment decision, the burden would 
shift to the defendant to demonstrate the same decision would have been made 
absent this unlawful motive. This reasoning naturally sparked rebuttal from ISC 
scholars such as Krieger who argued that the majority’s holding confounded the 
concepts of motive, intent, and causation by premising liability entirely on the 
presence of conscious discriminatory motive, even though discrimination largely 
operates below conscious intent.15 Similar arguments grounded in ISC testimony 
9. See generally Kahn, supra note 1, chs 2-3.
10. Kahn, supra note 1 at 11 [emphasis added].
11. See generally “The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination 
and Equal Employment Opportunity” (1995) 47 Stan L Rev 1161.
12. See generally “Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias” in Mitu Gulati & Michael 
Yelnosky, eds, NYU Selected Essays on Employment Law: Behavioral Analyses of Workplace 
Discrimination, vol 3 (Kluwer Law International, 2007).
13. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T Fiske, “Behavioural Realism in 
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment” (2006) 
94 Cal L Rev 997.
14. See Kahn, supra note 1 at 41; 490 US 228 (1989) [Price Waterhouse].
15. Krieger, supra note 11 at 1172, 1183, 1216-17.
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were used by the plaintiffs in more recent Iowa Supreme Court decisions around 
racial discrimination claims in employment practices,16 but it is unclear to what 
extent such arguments are determinative to the success of the plaintiff’s claims.
For Kahn, a defining feature of behavioural realists is the emphasis on the 
legal and policy applications, particularly when addressing racial discrimination. 
While he finds this goal laudable, he argues for a deeper examination of the 
possible externalities that may result from blindly embracing a behavioural 
realism framework.
II. EXISTING CRITIQUES OF BEHAVIOURAL REALISM AND 
KAHN’S ARGUMENT
Kahn is clear in his treatise that he is not the first to raise critiques about the 
application of behavioural realism to advance legal and policy goals. Early in 
the book, he provides a clear summary of critiques made by other scholars. 
Scholars of psychology have primarily criticized behavioural realism for its 
attempt to directly generalize and apply empirical studies, which largely measure 
bias through individuals’ differential reaction time to stimuli in the form of 
real-world, discriminatory contexts.17 The highly controlled nature of such 
experiments, combined with the fact that participants in these studies tend to be 
what researchers refer to as “WEIRD” (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, 
and Democratic),18 calls into question their actual statistical power and suggests 
the potential for overestimates of “effect size.” Ultimately, this raises concerns 
about the reproducibility of results and whether behavioural realism can reliably 
predict any form of class-wide discrimination or its tangible outcomes.19
Kahn’s criticisms are more policy than data-driven. He raises two broad 
critiques of behavioural realism’s applications to the law, discussing them at length:
A. BEHAVIOURAL REALISM IS TOO REDUCTIONIST A FRAME FOR 
ADDRESSING RACIAL JUSTICE
To understand Kahn’s concern here, consider the typical implicit bias experiment 
employed by behavioural realists. An individual is presented with words and 
is asked to quickly sort them into categories. The words may refer to different 
combinations of visual (racial) stimuli, race-encoding, and qualitative evaluations 
16. See e.g. Pippen v State, 854 NW (2d) 1 at 6 (Iowa Sup Ct 2014).
17. Kahn, supra note 1 at 55.
18. Ibid at 56.
19. Ibid.
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(i.e., good or bad). A score, based on how long on average it takes an individual 
to respond, is generated. The score is then extrapolated to provide implicit 
preferences (or the opposite) for one group over another.20
To put it simply, this kind of quantification is seductive. There is intrinsic 
appeal to finding a technical explanation to complex legal and social problems—
science holds the simultaneous power of authority and objectivity. However, this 
human tendency towards measurement is not without drawbacks. Kahn cites 
anthropologist Sally Engle Merry for her critique that “counting things … [makes] 
them comparable, which means they are inevitably stripped of their context, 
history, and meaning.”21 Seeking a scientific explanation for discrimination is 
a dangerous proposition because it looks to source the phenomena of racism to 
neural mechanisms rather than broader social structures.
Kahn contrasts this framework with the “cultural meaning test” proposed by 
legal scholar Charles Lawrence III,22 which looks to broader cultural and historical 
phenomena to evaluate whether a particular act conveys a discriminatory or 
stigmatizing message. Lawrence acknowledged cultural and historical context in 
his scholarship to make structural biases visible to jurists tasked with recognizing 
discriminatory behavior. The problem with racism, according to Lawrence, 
lies not in the individual actor’s conscious or unconscious motivation, but the 
continued existence of a widely shared belief in white supremacy.23 Although this 
addresses some of the contentions raised by Kahn, it remains unclear whether 
he is advocating for such a framework to supplant behavioral realism altogether, 
or to merely inform it.
Kahn also takes issue with the scientism employed by behavioral realists 
because accepting such a status quo may undermine developing interventions to 
address the problem. Essentializing racism to individual-level implicit biases tends 
to promote seeking individual-level and often scientific, solutions. Kahn includes 
examples of interventions such as the practice of employers name-blinding 
20. See ibid at 28, citing “Project Implicit” (2012), online: Harvard University <www.
projectimplicit.net/about.html> [perma.cc/Y5GP-A3VY].
21. Supra note 1, citing The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring Human Rights, Gender 
Violence, and Sex Trafficking (University of Chicago Press, 2016) at 1.
22. Compare “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism” 
(1987) 39 Stan L Rev 317.
23. See “Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of ‘The Id, the 
Ego, and Equal Protection’” (2008) 40 Conn L Rev 931 at 951.
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applications,24 judicial education programs around implicit bias,25 and the 
task force on implicit bias developed by the American Bar Association, whose 
programming includes highlights of evidence of the human ability to dismantle 
and overcome bias using specific techniques.26 Kahn also critiques the neoliberal 
turn in American politics and society to “commodify everything,” pointing out 
that diversity management and related applications of behavioural realism have 
become major, and profitable industries.27 These interventions aim to eliminate 
bias by increasing self-awareness, and although Kahn concedes they may have the 
capacity at some level to lessen discriminatory behaviour, they are not a solution 
to the problem of racism.
Of particular concern is that since behavioural realism and neuroscience 
research portrays racism as a biological and individual-level phenomenon, 
the stage is set for biological and pharmaceutical interventions. It is this 
“pathologizing” of racism as an anomalous medical condition, and the potential 
concomitant “biologizing” of treatments for anti-racism that Kahn sees the most 
dangerous of all,28 as it seeks to find a “silver-bullet” solution to a complex issue, 
and further, provides the individual with a means to shirk accountability for 
discriminatory attitudes.
B. BEHAVIOURAL REALISM INVOLVES EMBRACING THE POLITICALLY 
CONSERVATIVE FRAMES EMBEDDED IN CURRENT AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
Kahn’s second main critique of behavioural realism deals with the implicit 
embracing of conservative doctrinal frames that come with applying social 
scientific evidence of bias to jurisprudence around race and discrimination. There 
are five aspects of conservative doctrine in anti-discrimination jurisprudence that 
Kahn discusses: (i) time, i.e., the tendency for ISC to treat racism as a thing of 
the past, and implicit bias as the present concern,29 (ii) the focus on individual 
rights over group rights, (iii) the conservative focus on “intent” in identifying 
24. See e.g. Kahn, supra note 1 at 50-51. In the 1970s, to address gender bias in hiring, 
candidates for the American Symphony Orchestra would audition from behind a curtain so 
that hiring decisions would be based solely on performance.
25. Ibid at 52-53.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid at 169.
28. Ibid at 216-19. One example that Kahn provides is Propranolol, a drug commonly used to 
treat hypertension, but which researchers have recently begun asserting abolishes “implicit 
bias” by affecting response times on Implicit Association Tests (ibid at 218).
29. Ibid at 64.
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discrimination over evidence of disparate impact, (iv) the promotion of the ideal 
of colour-blindness and transcending past the perception of racial difference, and 
(v) the privileging of the idea of “merit” over distributive justice.30 Although he 
goes into each of these aspects in detail, Kahn believes it is the latter two points 
that prove to be the most detrimental to achieving racial justice.
The Equal Protection Clause in the American Constitution guarantees that 
the law must protect all people equally.31 The “antisubordination” school of 
racial justice, to which Kahn belongs, holds that because of the history of white 
supremacy in America, it is necessary to affirmatively protect racial minorities to 
meaningfully meet the demands of equal protection. If the law does not actively 
defend minorities and their rights to equal protection under the law, this is, 
on its face, a violation of their rights. However, behavioural realism’s tendency to 
promote a colour-blind ideal and erase the historical context of discrimination 
raises issues around what the right to equal protection entails in practice. This is 
perhaps best illustrated in the context of affirmative action.
Kahn gives careful consideration to several cases, notably Regents of 
California University v Bakke,32 the infamous case of the white, male NASA 
engineer who sued the University of California after being rejected from medical 
school, arguing that quotas imposed by the university for marginalized students 
disadvantaged him by affecting his likelihood of admission. According to Kahn 
and the antisubordination school of thought, programming that affirmatively 
acts in favor of minorities is both consistent with the equal protection clause and 
is not an attack on the “majority,” i.e., those who have always been protected by 
the law. Justice Powell’s judgement in Bakke is known for being the decision that 
ended race-based quotas in admissions standards, while simultaneously upholding 
the consideration of race as one factor among many others used to evaluate 
applications for admission. According to Kahn, this marked the beginning of 
the contemporary colour-blind jurisprudence of the US Court.33 Treating race 
as merely another factor in affirmative action programming strips race of its 
distinctive history and meaning. This approach reinforces the behavioural realist 
frame that racism is merely an individual-level cognitive glitch, easily redressed 
by focusing on the watered-down and vague notion of “diversity” rather than 
restorative justice for wronged communities.34
30. Ibid.
31. US Const, amend XIV, § 1.
32. 438 US 265 (1978) [Bakke].
33. Supra note 1 at 81.
34. Ibid at 90-91.
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Post-Bakke, Kahn argues that behavioral realism has resulted in a 
jurisprudential shift towards a neoliberal and colour-blind vision of meritocracy, 
resulting in tension between the desire for meritorious hiring and admissions 
decisions, and the equal protection of minority communities. Kahn flags this 
as a problematic externality of behavioral realism’s perpetuation of conservative 
frames, stating that “the neoliberal ideal of merit reduces the subject to nothing 
more than his or her ability to perform specified tasks, whether playing an 
instrument or taking a standardized test.”35 For Kahn, equality for minorities 
cannot truly be achieved without equity-oriented affirmative action that accounts 
for historical injustices experienced by disadvantaged groups.
The central thesis of Race on the Brain is essentially this: Behavioural realism, 
and the application of implicit-bias based analyses to the law, have, due to their 
promotion of conservative doctrinal frames, worked to undermine the Equal 
Protection Clause and related legislation pertaining to the Civil Rights Act. Thus, 
despite noble intentions, behavioural realism is not a vehicle for promoting 
substantive equality.
III. CONCLUSION
A surface-level reading of Race on the Brain might leave one with the impression 
that Kahn seeks to leave the reader with a scathing indictment of behavioural 
realism as a school of thought, one with little credibility in contemporary discourse 
on race. Without engaging more deeply with his analysis, it is easy to interpret it 
as painting behavioural realism as too rigid and prescriptive a lens to be applied 
to the law. It is important to note that Kahn is not arguing that he does not 
believe humans hold implicit biases favouring certain racial groups above others. 
Rather, he is merely arguing that by applying ISC to the law, behavioural realists 
are overly reliant on this concept to explain the complex nature of race relations 
in North America. Allowing “implicit bias” to replace “racism” allows the society 
to shirk accountability for addressing the broader social and political climate in 
which racism proliferates. “It makes racial injustice into primarily a function 
of individual mindsets and intent,” Kahn says. “It makes the past irrelevant, 
35. Ibid at 113.
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it ignores structural factors, and it focuses on the intent of the perpetrator rather 
than on the impact of the person who is actually experiencing the harm.”36
Kahn concludes his book with a call to action for white Americans (and 
really, white individuals at large). He implores them to reflect on their social 
location and to challenge the contemporary narratives of racism and injustice; 
that is, to question the way that implicit bias theory has permeated into modern 
constitutional jurisprudence. While he thinks behavioral realism is a valid field of 
study, he believes it to be a skewed way to tell the story about racism in America. 
For him, it is this story, not the science itself, that needs to be contested.37 That 
the legacy of racism is still very much alive encapsulates Kahn’s key point: Racism 
is more than a historical relic, and is more than an individual attitude—at its 
fundamental existence, it is a question of power.
Race on the Brain ultimately offers the reader a provocative analysis of the 
intersection between psychology, race, and the law. This is a book with the 
capacity to enrich conversations about the socio-political and legal dimensions of 
race and racism for years to come. With his book, Kahn has made a timely and 
thoughtful contribution to an area of research that, perhaps most importantly, 
does justice to a sensitive topic and the communities affected by it.
36. “Professor Jonathan Kahn Takes On Implicit Bias in New Book” (14 February 2018), 
online: Mitchell Hamline School of Law <www.mitchellhamline.edu/news/2018/02/14/
professor-jonathan-kahn-takes-on-implicit-bias-in-new-book/?fbclid=IwAR3RdGBWdoFO7l
irriTkfsUq0If7PkPh5QfETlmOcZQLILVcB_-kbknhi7I> [perma.cc/6A4B-N4KP].
37. Ibid at 233-34.
